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I. BACKGROUND
The words “Equal Justice Under Law” are etched above the main
entrance to the building of the Supreme Court of the United States. 1 Yet
we know that this ideal has not been achieved for all Americans. Our
society celebrates seminal Supreme Court cases like Brown v. Board of
Education2 and Loving v. Virginia,3 but we cannot forget that such
decisions were only necessary because of earlier decisions like Dred Scott
v. Sandford4 and Plessy v. Ferguson 5—cases which gave their blessing to
slavery, Jim Crow laws, and other horrific injustices.
Today, most Americans support racial equality and claim they
would have opposed slavery or marched for civil rights if they were alive
during those periods. However, the historical record reflects that a large
majority of Americans opposed these movements, with public support
only growing decades later. 6 Such attitudes were not limited to members
of the public. For instance, it is often overlooked that the Supreme Court
in Brown had reversed the decision of a three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas that entered judgment in
favor of the Topeka Board of Education after holding that segregated
school systems were not unconstitutional. 7
It may be tempting to simply dismiss the judges who authored or
joined decisions affirming slavery, segregation, and similar horrors as
openly and unabashedly racist. While they certainly were racist, these
opinions mimicked the so-called “Southern Strategy,” utilizing abstract
reasoning and concepts to reach the result rather than simply citing to
racist rhetoric.8 For instance, the district court opinion in Brown did not
state that it was upholding school segregation because African-Americans
were an inferior race; rather, the opinion follows the traditional structure
and form of a judicial opinion, purporting to reach the result based on
1

About the Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/about.aspx (last visited June 16, 2021).
2
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
5
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6
See David Sirota, Polls Showed Many Americans Opposed to Civil Rights
Protests in the 1960s. But That Changed, JACOBIN (June 12, 2020), https://www.jacobin
mag.com/2020/06/polls-george-floyd-protests-civil-rights-movement.
7
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954).
8
Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater's Infamous 1981 Interview on the
Southern Strategy, THE NATION (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article
/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy/.
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legal analysis and application of precedent. Moreover, the lower court
highlighted some of the purported benefits of the segregated system, such
as how “the school district transports colored children to and from school
free of charge,” while “[n]o such service is furnished to white children.”9
For the people who reside in America’s territories, the phrase
“Equal Justice Under Law” remains an illusion. More than one-hundred
years ago, the Supreme Court relied on now-discredited theories of racial
inequality and the white man’s burden to hold in the Insular Cases that
the United States Constitution does not follow the flag. 10 The Supreme
Court denied these constitutional protections to residents of America’s
insular territories with the support of the legal academy, with prominent
scholars of the time publishing articles in the leading law review
supporting separate and unequal treatment of the territories acquired after
the Spanish-American War based on conceptions of racial inferiority.11 In
effect, the legal elites of American society determined that the
overwhelmingly non-white residents of these territories were simply
unable to be governed in accordance with the United States Constitution.
Today, any judge or lawyer who used the same racist rhetoric
relied upon in the Insular Cases would face professional discipline,12 and
any law professor who promoted such ideas would be immediately
removed from the classroom. 13 Clearly, it is no longer acceptable to
9

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1951).
The Insular Cases typically refers to a series of six opinions issued by the
Supreme Court of the United States during its 1901 term, including De Lima v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); and Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co.,
182 U.S. 392 (1901). However, some jurists and scholars include additional cases within
the Insular Cases, such as Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); and Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 442
U.S. 465 (1922). For purposes of this Essay, the term Insular Cases encompasses all
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States prior to the transition of the
insular territories from direct federal control to democratically-elected local
governments.
11
See, e.g., C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 365 (1899); Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the
Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV.
393 (1899); James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1899);
Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions — A Third View, 13 HARV.
L. REV. 155 (1899).
12
See AM. BAR ASS’N MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT 8.4(g).
13
See, e.g., UPenn Law Professor Removed for Calling Black Students Inferior,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/03/15/upenn-law-professorremoved-for-calling-black-students-inferior/.
10
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profess that rights should be withheld from the residents of American
territories because they are “alien races,” “savage,” “half-civilized,” or
“ignorant and lawless.”14
Although rhetoric has changed, the law has not. Unlike Dred Scott
and Plessy, the Insular Cases have not been expressly overturned, and in
fact are still cited by judges, lawyers, and Presidential administrations of
all parts of the ideological spectrum as grounds for treating certain
American territories less favorably. 15 While their racist reasoning may
have been disavowed, 16 the Insular Cases continue to serve as a
justification for treating some Americans differently because of where
they call home.
The continued vitality of the Insular Cases more than a century
later—combined with high profile events such as the Puerto Rican debt
crisis and Hurricane Irma—has drawn renewed attention to the political
and legal statuses of America’s insular territories. Organizations such as
the American Bar Association have publicly called for territorial equality
in many areas such as voting rights.17 Leading law reviews such as the
Yale Law Journal and the Harvard Law Review, in an apparent attempt to
atone for their role in the Insular Cases, have published special issues
with scholarship calling for their overturn. Law schools including Yale
Law School and Columbia Law School have offered courses focused on
the Insular Cases and the law of the territories.
Unfortunately, during this period of renewed interest, some legal
elites have proposed what they describe as “new” solutions to the status
question.18 These proposals essentially concede that the Insular Cases
were wrongly decided, but ultimately push against efforts to formally
overturn the Insular Cases. Instead, these proposals argue that achieving
change is too hard, and that the people of the territories and their allies
should just accept their second-class status and focus on achieving what
the proponents believe are more “workable” or “pragmatic” goals. These
“workable” and “pragmatic” goals consist of things such as lobbying the
federal government for additional funding,19 establishing a “different but
equal” regime in which territories would be permitted to enact legislation
14
See Thayer, supra note 11, at 475; Baldwin, supra note 11, at 415; Downes,
182 U.S. at 287.
15
Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux & Neil C. Weare, After Aurelius: What Future for
the Insular Cases?, 130 YALE L. J. FORUM 284 (2020).
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Resolution 10C (Aug. 2020).
18
See, e.g., Territorial Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1632 (2017); Russell
Rennie, A Qualified Defense of the Insular Cases, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1683 (2017); Tom
C.W. Lin, Americans, Almost and Forgotten, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1249 (2019).
19
Lin, supra note 18, at 1253.
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which discriminates against “mainlanders,” 20 and persuading the federal
courts to “actively scrutinize” (but not prohibit) “congressional
intervention in territorial self-governance.”21 Though they are given
different names by their proponents, all of these proposals urge the
territorial peoples to acquiesce to what is best described as a territorial
paternalism.
Why do these scholars urge that territorial residents and their allies
abandon the quest for equal rights? The reason, they claim, is that the
Americans who call the territories home are “politically powerless.”22
They live in “geographic isolation”23 on “crumbling island[s]”24 with
“simple econom[ies]”25 that are “generally stagnant.”26 They have
“problems securing safe drinking water.”27 They are “prime targets for
enemies of the United States,” 28 and generally live their lives with “a
sense of hopelessness”29 because of the “cauldron of burdens that their
fellow citizens in the States do not have to carry.”30 The people of the
territories, these scholars maintain, should not make equal rights their
primary focus because any victories achieved would “seem like pyrrhic
victories when juxtaposed with the grim long-term outlooks of storm-torn
neighborhoods, shuttered businesses, bombing threats, dilapidated
schools, and mass exoduses of family and friends.” 31 Because the people
of the territories lack the ability to “meaningfully advocate on [their]
behalf via the normal political process,” they must be “protect[ed]” by the
federal courts—but only to a certain point.32 And because the people of
the territories cannot be trusted to preserve their culture, “territorial
residents, to co-exist meaningfully—to be equal, in a sense—in the
American republican system require a different set of rights and
obligations,” such as the allowance to enact ancestry-based restrictions on
alienation of land to “mainlanders.”33
This reasoning is no different from the Insular Cases and the
scholarship written to support unequal treatment; the only difference is
20

Rennie, supra note 18, at 1708-09.
Territorial Federalism, supra note 18, at 1653-54.
22
Lin, supra note 18, at 1252.
23
Id. at 1264.
24
Id. at 1252.
25
Id. at 1260.
26
Id. at 1261.
27
Id. at 1272.
28
Id. at 1276.
29
Id. at 1271.
30
Id. at 1281.
31
Id. at 1284.
32
Territorial Federalism, supra note 18, at 1653-54.
33
Rennie, supra note 18, at 1709-10.
21
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that words like “savage,” “half-civilized,” and “ignorant” have been
replaced with words like “powerless,” “isolated,” and “hopeless.” Despite
purporting to take a moderate position, 34 these proposals effectively use
soft language to embrace the reasoning and result of the Insular Cases:35
namely, that residents of the territories are unable to care for themselves
and should be treated differently by the federal government. The
proponents of territorial paternalism, while publicly professing support for
the people of the territories, have crossed the line going from ally to
“white savior.” 36
Had these articles been ignored by the courts and other decisionmakers—as is the case with much legal scholarship 37—it would be simple
to dismiss these theories as well-meaning but misguided. However, just
as the Supreme Court of the United States made Lowell’s “Third Way”
into the law of the land a century ago, some courts have accepted the
invitation to purportedly “repurpose” the Insular Cases.
Most
prominently and recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit expressly invoked the Insular Cases to withhold birthright
citizenship from the people of American Samoa and other territories:
Notwithstanding its beginnings, the approach developed in
the Insular Cases and carried forward in recent Supreme
Court decisions can be repurposed to preserve the dignity
and autonomy of the peoples of America’s overseas
territories . . . The flexibility of the Insular Cases’
framework gives federal courts significant latitude to
34

Interestingly, Professor Lowell, whose article in the Harvard Law Review
provided the reasoning for the holdings of the Insular Cases, had also portrayed his
proposal as a moderate one, as evidenced by the very title of his article as proposing a
“Third Way” to resolve the question of territorial incorporation. Lowell, supra note 11.
35
Hon. Juan R. Torruella, Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further
Experimentation with its Future: A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” 131
HARV. L. REV. F. 65 (2018) (“[T]his ‘new’ scheme is not only not new, but is in fact a
repackaging of the same unequal colonial relationship that has been in place since
American troops landed in Guánica in 1898.”).
36
The “white savior” is a common trope in literature in which the hero of the
story—typically a white man portrayed by the author as enlightened or even Christlike—serves as a champion of a marginalized group—such as blacks in the Jim Crow
South or the indigenous people of what is portrayed as a “foreign” land—but in the
process reinforces the oppression by providing validation that the marginalized group is
not able to take care of itself. A well-known example of the white savior trope is Atticus
Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird. See Sarah Gerwig-Moore, To Outgrow a Mockingbird:
Confronting Our History—As Well as Our Fictions—About Indigent Defense in the Deep
South, 54 GA. L. REV. 1297, 1302 (2020).
37
See generally Mark Cooney, What Judges Cite: A Study of Three Appellate
Courts, 50 STETSON L. REV. 1 (2020).
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preserve traditional cultural practices that might otherwise
run afoul of individual rights enshrined in the Constitution.
This same flexibility permits courts to defer to the
preferences of indigenous peoples, so that they may chart
their own course.38
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit utilized this “flexibility” to defer to the
wishes of the Executive Branch of the Government of American Samoa,
which argued that birthright citizenship under the Citizenship Clause
should be denied not just to all American Samoans, but to those born in
other United States territories as well.
This Article strives to deconstruct and dismantle the most
prominent misconceptions and outright lies being used to justify the
continued withholding of constitutional rights and liberties from American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. Part II addresses the claim that territories are not selfgoverning or are otherwise effectively ruled from Washington, D.C., by a
Congress that is completely unresponsive to any of their concerns. Part
III examines the portrayal of the territories as geographically isolated,
crumbling, lacking safe drinking water, and otherwise substantially
underdeveloped compared to the mainland United States. Finally, Part IV
proposes several empowering strategies that the territories and their allies
could pursue to improve their current status-quo, which are not grounded
in paternalism and would not require surrendering the long-term struggle
for equal rights.
II. TERRITORIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL POWER
Proponents of a “pragmatic” solution describe America’s
territories as “colonies of bygone eras,” representing that “[t]he Territories
have various forms of limited, local self-governance,” and “are subject to
the plenary powers of Congress” through the Territorial Clause of the
United States Constitution, which “imposes very few limitations on
Congress’s plenary powers.”39 Congress is purportedly not responsive to
the needs of the territories because “the Territories do not have a voting
representative in the House or Senate that can advocate on their behalf”
and “also do not have an electoral vote in the Electoral College for
presidential elections.”40
To describe America’s five insular territories as “colonies” having
38

Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 870-71 (10th Cir. 2021).
Lin, supra note 18, at 1265.
40
Id.
39
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only “limited, local self-governance” is, of course, inaccurate. It is true
that at the time the Insular Cases were decided, Puerto Rico, Guam, and
American Samoa were either under military rule or administered by nonindigenous civilian governors who were appointed by the President of the
United States.41 This was also the case with the U.S. Virgin Islands after
its annexation in 1917,42 and while certain reforms were adopted—such as
elected territorial legislatures—all four of those territories remained under
the control of presidentially-appointed governors through the 1950s and
1960s.43
But while territorial governments may have only exercised
“limited” power in the past, today that is no longer the case. Puerto Rico
became self-governing in 1952 with the ratification of the Constitution of
Puerto Rico, which provided for a locally elected Governor, a locally
elected Legislature, and a Judicial Branch consisting of local judges
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Puerto
Rican Senate.44 American Samoa also achieved nearly equivalent local
control over its internal affairs with the adoption of the Constitution of
American Samoa in 1967, which provided for a locally elected Governor,
a locally elected Legislature, and a Judicial Branch whose judges are
mostly appointed by the Governor. 45 The U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam
achieved self-governance in a more piecemeal fashion, with a locally
elected Legislature ultimately authorized in 1950, a locally-elected
Governor granted in 1968, and a locally appointed Judicial Branch
authorized in 1984, although the territories chose not to establish the local
supreme courts until later. 46 The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands has always been self-governing, having joined the United States as
a territory in 1986 with a constitution authorizing a locally elected
Governor, a locally elected Legislature, and a locally appointed Judicial
Branch.47
The modern-day territorial governments of American Samoa,
Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands are the equivalent of a state government in virtually every way.
Their territorial governors exercise the same powers with the same
41
See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United
States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 472-93 (1992).
42
Id. at 494-96.
43
Id. at 472-96.
44
Id. at 472-73.
45
Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 90 (D.D.C. 2013).
46
See In re Camacho, 2004 Guam 10 ¶¶ 28-30 (Guam 2006); Jackson v. West
Indian Co., 944 F. Supp. 423, 429 (D.V.I. 1996).
47
See United States ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 751 (9th
Cir. 1993).
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limitations as their counterparts in the fifty states. Their territorial
legislatures may pass laws on any subject upon which a state legislature
would be permitted to do the same. The territorial judicial branches
exercise the same jurisdiction as a state court system and are treated by
the federal courts as if they were state courts. 48
But perhaps most importantly, all three branches of the territorial
governments are ultimately accountable to the people of the territory, just
as all branches of a state government answer to the people of their state.
For all intents and purposes, the governments of American Samoa, Guam,
Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are
indistinguishable from the governments of the fifty states. To describe
this as only “limited, local self-governance” diminishes the work of the
Americans who serve in our territorial governments and minimizes the
accomplishments of the territorial residents who fought for these rights
over the course of a century.
Of course, America’s territories remain subject to the powers of
Congress vested through the Territorial Clause, whatever they may be.49
But when in recent memory has Congress actually exercised this power to
nullify territorial legislation? Congress has not nullified legislation duly
enacted by a territorial government pursuant to its powers under the
Territorial Clause since those territorial governments began to operate as
the equivalent to state governments. Even in American Samoa—where
the territorial constitution reserves certain rights to the Secretary of the
Interior—such interference has not occurred, and the Secretary of Interior
declines to exercise any authority out of a “desire to foster autonomy and
self-governance . . .”50
Moreover, placing such heavy emphasis on the powers that
Congress may exercise over the territories under the Territorial Clause
48

See, e.g., MRL Development I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 823 F.3d 195,
201-202 (3d Cir. 2016); Davison v. Gov’t of P.R.-P.R. Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d 220,
223 (1st Cir. 2006).
49
Professor Lin describes the power of Congress under the Territorial Clause as
a “plenary” power with “very few limitations.” Lin, supra note 18, at 1265-66.
However, even the United States Supreme Court has not described the Territorial Clause
in such terms, having emphasized that the power of Congress was plenary only with
respect to establishing temporary governments. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
Because the temporary governments in existence at the time the Insular Cases were
decided no longer exist and have been replaced with permanent territorial governments
that function in all meaningful respects as state governments, it is arguable—and perhaps
even likely—that Congress can no longer exercise complete and unfettered plenary
control over the internal affairs of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern
Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
50
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Hodel, 637 F. Supp. 1398, 1417 (D.D.C. 1986).
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wrongfully implies that the fifty states may operate independently without
Congressional interference. Yet, under the Supremacy Clause, Congress
possesses plenary authority over the states in all areas in which federal
power exists, including the enactment of federal laws that “curtail or
prohibit the States’ prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting
subjects the States may consider important.” 51 Such federal powers
include the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause—a power so broad that it has been described as authorizing
Congress to regulate virtually anything.52 Despite this reality, no one
would seriously contend that the residents of the fifty states may only
exercise “limited, local self-governance.”53
Proponents of territorial paternalism are correct about one thing:
none of the five inhabited United States territories possesses electoral
votes or representatives with a floor vote in Congress. The failure of the
United States to provide such representation to the peoples of American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands is “a gross civil rights violation perpetrated for over a
century against several million U.S. citizens,” and as a matter of policy it
is completely indefensible that “geographic location should make any
difference or have any relevance to a determination of such fundamental
questions as the rights to which a citizen is entitled.” 54
It is a far cry to say that the lack of electoral votes or congressional
representatives with a floor vote renders the territories completely
powerless with no say in shaping national policy. The characterization of
the territories’ House delegates as “powerless” because they lack a floor
vote ignores the practical reality that all meaningful legislative work
occurs within the House’s committees—on which the territorial delegates
are eligible to serve and even chair—and that legislation will rarely be
brought to a floor vote by the Speaker unless passage is expected. As a
result, representatives who have a floor vote but are not permitted to serve
51

Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 290

(1981).
52

See Ronald D. Rotunda, King v. Burwell and the Rise of the Administrative
State, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 267, 271 (2015).
53
In fact, territorial governments may in certain instances exercise even greater
powers than their counterparts in the fifty states. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has held that because territorial governments are instrumentalities of
the federal government, the restraints of the Dormant Commerce Clause do not apply,
and Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands may therefore adopt laws that discriminate
against non-local commerce that would be unconstitutional if enacted by a state. See
Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Anthony
Ciolli, The Power of United States Territories to Tax Interstate and Foreign Commerce:
Why the Commerce and Import-Export Clauses Do Not Apply, 63 TAX LAW 1223 (2010).
54
Torruella, supra note 35, at 97.
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on committees are said to be “in exile” and “kind of just a hitchhiker”
with “very little influence.”55 Delegate Stacey Plaskett of the U.S. Virgin
Islands, for example, sits on the powerful House Committee on Ways and
Means, and as a result exercises substantially more influence in the House
of Representatives than most voting representatives.56
The practical effect of the lack of electoral votes allocated to the
territories is substantially overstated. It is common knowledge that in
today’s polarized political climate, presidential campaigns ignore states
they view as “safe” for their political party or that of their opponent,
instead focusing only on so-called swing states. 57 Not surprisingly, a
substantially disproportionate amount of federal funds are typically
steered to swing states by the Executive Branch in the years prior to a
presidential election.58 While it is certainly true that excluding the
territories from the general election for President of the United States
constitutes a gross violation of civil rights for the people of those
territories (given that all five territories would likely be “safe” for a
political party), it is not readily apparent that any of the territories would
be in a greater position to influence national legislation if they were to
receive electoral votes through constitutional amendment or otherwise. 59
III. LIFE IN THE TERRITORIES
Proponents of territorial paternalism typically juxtapose the
territories’ lack of political power with a portrayal of life in those
territories as significantly worse than life in the fifty states. Such
See, e.g., Melanie Zanona, ‘They Basically Have Nothing To Do’: Trio of
Republicans Face Life in Exile, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.politico.com
/story/2019/02/04/congress-house-republicans-committee-assignments-stripped1145320.
56
See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of
the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 82 (1990) (summarizing empirical studies of Congress).
57
See Geoffrey Calderaro, Promoting Democracy While Preserving
Federalism: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote, and the Federal District
Popular Vote Allocation Alternative, 82 MISS L. J. 287, 299-300 (2013) (noting that
during the 2012 presidential election, the Romney and Obama campaigns both only
campaigned in ten states, with forty states failing to host a single campaign event by
either candidate).
58
JOHN HUDAK, PRESIDENTIAL PORK: WHITE HOUSE INFLUENCE OVER THE
DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL GRANTS 55-59 (2014).
59
In fact, it would appear that providing the territories with formal
representation in the United States Senate—even if it were non-voting—would likely do
substantially more to further the goal of influencing appropriations and national policy
than anything else.
55
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proponents often emphasize the “geographic isolation” of the territories 60
and describe them as “crumbling island[s]” 61 with “simple econom[ies]”62
that are “generally stagnant.”63 They paint territorial inhabitants as having
“problems securing safe drinking water,” 64 living in fear of being “prime
targets for enemies of the United States,” 65 and proceeding with “a sense
of hopelessness”66 because of the “cauldron of burdens that their fellow
citizens in the States do not have to carry.” 67
From these descriptions, one might get the impression that life in
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the
Northern Mariana Islands is more akin to life in war-torn Burundi or
South Sudan than life in the fifty states. Fortunately, this is not remotely
the case. What is unfortunate is that these outrageous descriptions—
typically made by individuals who have never lived in a territory—are
often used as justification for treating the people of the territories as
second-class citizens, or worse.
Of course, life in the territories is not perfect. Like other parts of
the United States, territorial governments and their people struggle with
certain challenges. But each territory is unique, and not every territory
experiences the same issues as the other territories. For example, one of
the leading articles proposing a paternalist solution to the territories
alleges that territorial inhabitants live in fear of terrorism.68 Yet, the sole
authority given to support this proposition is a law review article—
published during the height of the global war on terror—speculating that
“some” in Guam may fear that its United States military bases may be
attacked.69 The article cites no data and, more importantly, it fails to
recognize that this concern is unique to Guam since the other five
inhabited territories lack a significant military presence.
This is also the case for the claim that the territories are
geographically isolated. This may well be the case for American Samoa,
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, which are between 2,500 and
4,000 miles from Hawaii and between 7,000 and 8,000 miles from
60

Lin, supra note 18, at 1264.
Id. at 1252.
62
Id. at 1260.
63
Id. at 1262.
64
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Washington, D.C. However, it is difficult to contend that the U.S. Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico are geographically isolated when they are only
approximately 1,500 miles from Washington, D.C.—significantly closer
than many states. And while such distances may have been significant
one-hundred and twenty years ago, the proliferation of modern
technologies such as air travel, television, and the Internet have reduced
their impact.
The same is true of the claim that the people of the territories
somehow live with a sense of hopelessness. The only authorities given to
support this claim are cherrypicked studies showing a relatively high
suicide rate in Guam, and anecdotal reports that young professionals leave
Puerto Rico for school or employment opportunities in the fifty states. 70
But again, this is not true of all the territories; for instance, the suicide rate
in the U.S. Virgin Islands is half the suicide rate in the United States. 71
Nor are the claims of widespread emigration supported by actual
data. While there certainly has been emigration of younger people from
Puerto Rico to the mainland United States, studies on the demographics of
those emigrants reveal that they are largely not professionals, and that the
unemployment rate of those emigrants after reaching the mainland was
more than double that of comparable individuals who remained in Puerto
Rico.72
Perhaps more importantly, the other territories are not
experiencing any meaningful net emigration, let alone substantial
emigration.
While the population of Puerto Rico has declined
precipitously, the populations of the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands have either remained constant or increased.73
This is the case even though the global economic recession affected all
territories, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, like Puerto Rico, suffered
catastrophic destruction from Hurricanes Irma and Maria. That these
territories did not experience meaningful emigration is strong evidence
that the emigration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland United States is due
to issues unique to Puerto Rico rather than issues experienced by the
territories as a whole.
Of course, it is true that the five territories do lag behind the fifty
states in various aggregate economic measures. Nevertheless, the
differences in standards of living are significantly overstated. For
70
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instance, recent data reflects that Guam has a higher median household
income than ten mainland states, and the U.S. Virgin Islands has a higher
per-capita income than Mississippi. 74
Reliance on such data, however, is also misleading because, given
the substantial differences in size and population between the territories
and the fifty states, it does not compare apples to apples. Every one of the
fifty states consists of urban, suburban, and rural areas, with different
areas within the state having different levels of economic development
and various standards of living. This is not the case, however, for the
territories, which, except for Puerto Rico, are geographically minute and
do not have the same variance within their jurisdictions. For example,
there are numerous communities throughout the fifty states with
substantially lower incomes and other markers than the territories; but
unlike the territories, those truly impoverished areas—typically rural—are
offset by significantly wealthier areas in those states. 75
Similarly, gaps between the rich and the poor tend to be greater in
the fifty states—particularly in cities—than in the territories, which tends
to paint a rosier picture for those areas than is actually the case. For
instance, although twenty-two percent of the population of the U.S. Virgin
Islands lives below the poverty line, that amount is considerably lower
than the poverty rates for Detroit (42.3%), Cleveland (36.1%), Cincinnati
(34.1%), Miami (31.7%), Fresno (31.5%), Buffalo (30.9%), Newark
(30.4%), Toledo (30.1%), Milwaukee (29.9%), and St. Louis (29.2%).76
While the per-capita incomes for those cities are admittedly larger than
the per-capita income of the U.S. Virgin Islands, this does not mean that
the standard of living for the typical Detroit resident is higher than that of
the typical Virgin Islander. On the contrary, it simply reflects a larger
disparity between the rich and the poor in Detroit relative to the U.S.
Virgin Islands, not to mention Detroit’s higher cost of living.
IV. SHORT-TERM STRATEGIES TO EMPOWER THE TERRITORIES
As the preceding sections demonstrate, modern-day theories of
territorial paternalism, despite using inclusive rather than racist language,
are nearly indistinguishable from the white man’s burden and other longdiscredited theories. They are effectively two sides to the same coin: both
would impose second-class citizenship indefinitely on the people of the
territories and both, in effect, would normalize the territories as wards of
the federal government.
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Yet, proponents of territorial paternalism are correct about one
thing: the territorial rights movement suffers greatly from the lack of goals
both achievable and pragmatic. For instance, a substantial focus of the
movement has been on advocating for the United States Supreme Court to
overturn the Insular Cases. Even if one were to put aside the difficulty in
persuading the Supreme Court, it is not clear what practical purpose this
would serve. Virtually all the meaningful provisions of the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution have already been extended to all or
most of the territories either through Congress or the courts. Moreover,
the most prominent injustice—that the people of the territories cannot vote
for the President of the United States or obtain representation in
Congress—was not caused by the Insular Cases at all. Rather, the
systematic disenfranchisement of the people of the territories comes
directly from the plain and unambiguous text of the United States
Constitution itself. This injustice will ultimately need to be addressed
either through statehood or a constitutional amendment, both of which are
essentially unattainable in today’s political climate.
Ultimately, any Supreme Court decision overturning the Insular
Cases would almost certainly be nothing more than a symbolic mea culpa,
issued a century after the damage has been done and more akin to Trump
v. Hawaii’s overturning of Korematsu v. United States than Brown v.
Board of Education’s overturning of Plessy v. Ferguson. But this does
not mean that the people of the territories and their allies should not
pursue this goal. On the contrary, “maintain[ing] a vision for long-term
change” is a highly critical component of any social movement; this,
however, must be balanced with some attempt at achieving “short-term
victories.”77 Long-term goals are critical to sustaining a social movement
because “[i]f the goals are finite and their achievement is discernable,
there is a significant risk that the mobilization will . . . dissipate once its
goals are met.”78 Similarly, achievable short-term goals are needed not
just to maintain momentum, but also to begin a dialogue that can “change
the knowledge base of the society” and move the proverbial Overton
window to effect change in the long term. 79
What sort of short-term goals should the territories and their allies
prioritize? One common paternalist proposal is that the territories pursue
greater federal funding from Congress, whether through direct
appropriations or through indirect exemptions from generally applicable
77
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federal legislation such as the Jones Act.80 Another common paternalist
proposal involves lobbying the federal courts to “actively scrutinize
congressional intervention in territorial self-governance” to make up for
the fact that “political decisionmakers lack the sort of firsthand experience
. . . that would enable them to empathize with [the territories’] problems
and needs.”81
The goals proposed by paternalists are not the short-term goals
needed to sustain a lasting territorial rights movement. They maintain the
status quo instead of upending it. Rather than allow the territories to chart
their own path, these proposals effectively concede the plenary authority
of the federal government over the territories and simply urge it to
exercise that power more benevolently. This strategy, if pursued by the
territories and their allies, would be akin to civil rights activists not
challenging the correctness of Plessy v. Ferguson, requesting instead that
the governments of the Southern states appropriate more money to blackonly schools and permit those schools to set their own curriculum. By
accepting the status quo, the territories and their allies would not just
legitimize it, they would make future attempts to deviate from it even
more difficult due to the prospect that those benefits may disappear.82
Nevertheless, there are several short-term goals that the territories
and their allies can realistically achieve without conceding the plenary
authority of the federal government over their own affairs or otherwise
furthering their second-class or unequal status. While it is not possible to
summarize all of these initiatives, this Article highlights three short-term
goals that, if adopted, would further the quest for ultimate equality.
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A. Representation in the Federal Judiciary
Most propositions suggested by territorial paternalists rest on the
assumption that the federal courts will engage in a “robust form of judicial
review” as a check on the plenary power of Congress or in some way
serve as the champions of the territories. 83 Such proposals, however,
ignore the fact that federal courts have historically been hostile to
territorial rights. After all, it was the Supreme Court of the United States,
and not Congress, that decided the Insular Cases and placed the onus on
Congress to serve as arbiter of the application of constitutional rights.
Even in contemporary times, federal courts have rejected virtually all
attempts to use the judicial system to achieve territorial parity,84 often
extending the Insular Cases despite being directed not to do so.85
Some may find the hostility of the federal courts to territorialrights litigation surprising given the common wisdom that federal judges
are more likely to issue rulings protecting marginalized groups and
otherwise safeguard individual rights. 86 Putting aside for a moment
whether this popular belief is anything but an example of cognitive bias in
the legal profession,87 the hostility of the federal courts to territorial-rights
claims should not be surprising given the absence of the territories from
the ranks of our nation’s Article III judges.
It is well-known that geography plays a substantial role in judicial
decision-making.88 For years, the states of Alaska and Hawaii lacked any
83
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active judicial representation on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit due to the persistent failure of multiple presidential
administrations to nominate lawyers from those states. As Judge Andrew
Kleinfeld—the second Alaskan to serve on the Ninth Circuit—explained
in written testimony before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts of Appeals, the failure to provide balanced geographic
representation on the federal courts of appeals adversely affects the
quality of appellate decisions in cases originating from unrepresented
areas:
Much federal law is not national in scope. Quite a
lot of federal litigation arises out of federal laws of
only local applicability, such as the Bonneville
Power Administration laws, the laws regarding
Hopi and Navaho relations, the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act, and the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act. It is easy to make a
mistake construing these laws when unfamiliar with
them, as we often are, or not interpreting them
regularly, as we never do.
Much federal procedure mirrors state
procedure in the particular district. For example,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 imports state
procedure. Where law is not specified, bar and
bench customs in the different localities often fill it
in. It is very helpful for judges to know how
releases, attorney’s fees contracts, and other
documents for common transactions, are typically
written in a state, so that they know when
something is suspicious and when it is ordinary. In
diversity cases, we are required to apply state law in
federal court.
Yet on our court, ordinarily no judge on the
panel has intimate familiarity with the law and
practices of the state in which the case arose, unless
(1985) (finding that there are regional differences in lawyer preferences for judicial
intervention in settlement, often based on state-court practices); THOMAS CHURCH ET AL.,
JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978) (finding
that the local legal culture is the strongest explanatory factor in understanding patterns of
case processing in different courts); PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION
AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT (1978) (finding significant differences in
criminal case types in two districts in the same state, resulting in different patterns of
plea bargaining and case processing).
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that state is California. A judge on my court sits in
Alaska perhaps once in ten years, and ordinarily
never sits in Montana, Idaho, Nevada, or Arizona.
Social conditions also vary, in ways that can
color judges’ reactions to facts, and disable them
from understanding the factual settings of cases not
arising in California. For example, judges from Los
Angeles have different assumptions about what
kind of people have guns than judges from Idaho,
Montana, and Alaska, who tend to associate gun
ownership with a high proportion, perhaps a
considerable majority, of the longtime law-abiding
residents of the state. Native Americans have
reservations in most states in our circuit, but in
Alaska reservations have generally been abolished.
It is quite possible for Alaska lawyers not to point
this out in a brief because it is so obvious and well
known, and for Ninth Circuit judges on a panel and
their law clerks, who have never been to Alaska,
not to know it.89
For similar reasons, Congress, concerned about the effects of this
lack of representation, amended Title 28, Section 44(c) of the United
States Code to mandate that at least one active federal court of appeals
judge be a resident of each state within the circuit. 90
This congressional legislation did not, however, extend its
requirement to residents of each territory within a circuit. No resident of
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, or the Northern Mariana Islands serves on
their respective federal courts of appeals. 91 While Judge Juan Torruella
served for nearly four decades as an active judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, his nomination was ultimately a
matter of executive discretion. Moreover, shortly after Judge Torruella’s
death on October 26, 2020, some openly wondered whether the President
would nominate a Puerto Rican resident as his successor or instead choose
to nominate a resident of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, or Rhode
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Island, leaving Puerto Rico with no representation on the First Circuit. 92
The need for a resident judge from each of the territories to serve
on their respective federal courts of appeals is highlighted by the effect
Judge Torruella’s lengthy service had on the First Circuit’s treatment of
Puerto Rico. While certainly a source of a few adverse rulings, especially
with respect to voting rights, 93 over Torruella’s tenure the First Circuit
issued some of the most favorable rulings in favor of territorial rights and
sovereignty yet seen.94 This is not simply due to Judge Torruella’s service
on First Circuit panels. As his former colleagues noted, Judge Torruella’s
very presence on the court certainly contributed to a greater understanding
of the issues facing the territories by the rest of the judges, who would
frequently talk with him about Puerto Rico’s status.95 As one fellow
federal judge put it, as “the first Puerto Rican to sit on a federal appeals
court of any kind . . . [Judge Torruella] made it his business to describe
and dismantle the doctrines that had made colonialism possible under the
Constitution,” but he did so “in a respectful academic form that aligned
his argument with that of the American civil-rights movement.”96
Although he did not always succeed in persuading his colleagues, he
nevertheless “helped to disinter the Insular Cases from the graveyard of
American historical memory” and ensure that the territorial perspective
was represented.97
But the impact of a resident judge from Puerto Rico serving on the
First Circuit is perhaps best demonstrated by examining the decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which exercises
appellate jurisdiction over federal cases originating in the U.S. Virgin
Islands—a mere 50 miles away from Puerto Rico. Unlike the First
Circuit, the Third Circuit has ruled against expanding the rights of the
92
See Josh Blackman, Judge Torruella, the Lone First Circuit Judge in Puerto
Rico, Passed Away, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 27, 2020 10:00 AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2020/10/27/judge-tourrella-the-lone-first-circuit-judge-inpuerto-rico-passed-away/. Ultimately, President Donald Trump nominated Raul AriasMarxuach, a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, to
the vacancy, although he was not confirmed by the United States Senate prior to the
adjournment of the 116th Congress. As of this writing, President Joe Biden has
nominated Chief Judge Gustavo Gelpi, also of the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico, to the vacancy.
93
See, e.g., Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 8 (1st Cir. 1994).
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people of the U.S. Virgin Islands and the sovereignty of the territory’s
local government in virtually every significant case that has come before
it in the last three decades.98 Moreover, within the Virgin Islands legal
community the Third Circuit is notorious for its judges’ ignorance of
territorial customs 99 and its misunderstanding of certain fundamental
aspects of Virgin Islands law.100
The lack of the U.S. Virgin Islands’ representation on the Third
Circuit—as well as the absence of jurists from Guam and the Northern
Mariana Islands on the Ninth Circuit—is compounded by the fact that the
United States District Courts of the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands are not Article III courts, but Article IV courts.
Although these federal courts exercise the same jurisdiction as Article III
district courts, Article III judges “shall hold their offices during good
behaviour and not have their compensation diminished.”101 Courts
established by Congress pursuant to Article IV, however, lack life tenure
and most other protections afforded by Article III. For instance, Congress
has provided that the federal district judges appointed to the United States
District Courts of the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands shall hold office for a term of ten years unless sooner removed by
the President for cause.102
Others have extensively examined the adverse effects of
designating the federal district courts in these territories as Article IV
courts, including the significant threat posed to judicial independence. 103
In fact, describing this as a threat is an understatement. There is
documented evidence of a successful campaign to lobby a President to
98
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withhold renomination to federal district judges in these territories due to
their rulings in particular cases. 104
The effect of this threat, while difficult to measure, is very real and
impacts the disposition of cases by those courts. Perhaps the most
transparent example of this occurred in the case of Ballentine v. United
States.105
In that case, the presiding judge issued a significant
interlocutory decision on the question of territorial-voting rights and
appeared poised to issue the first federal decision recognizing such a
right.106 The judge failed to do so, however, denying reappointment and
allowing a new judge—temporarily appointed by designation from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey—to issue a
decision applying the Insular Cases to dismiss the case for failure to state
a claim.107
Despite the critical need for independent federal judges to posses a
connection to, and understanding of, their local community, the territorial
rights movement has failed to prioritize federal-court representation.
Nevertheless, it appears that providing such representation is highly
achievable. The American Bar Association’s nearly five-hundredmember House of Delegates unanimously approved a resolution at its
2014 Annual Meeting, urging Congress to amend the United States Code
to mandate territorial representation on the federal courts of appeals.108
This shows that there is extraordinarily broad support—at least within the
legal profession—for providing such representation, and even those
opposed to territorial equality in other areas have no serious objection to
proper representation in the federal courts. Even in the absence of
legislation mandating equity, nothing precludes the President of the
United States from voluntarily nominating a Virgin Islands attorney to the
Third Circuit or an attorney from Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands
to the Ninth Circuit. After all, President Reagan nominated Judge
Torruella to the First Circuit without such a statutory mandate, and the
United States Senate confirmed Judge Torruella to that post unanimously
by voice vote.
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B. Full Utilization of Territorial Government Powers
Years ago, people would use the idiom “don’t make a federal case
out of it” to object to something being blown out of proportion. Today,
that expression has “fallen from fashion.”109 As the late Justice Antonin
Scalia once said when reminiscing about his law school graduation, “in
1960 [there was] real meaning to the phrase ‘don’t make a federal case out
of it,’” since “[t]he federal courts . . . were forums for the ‘big case’ . . .
[and] were not the place where one would find many routine tort and
employment disputes.”110 But this is no longer case. While the Founders
conceived of a federal government of limited powers—with power
decentralized in the states and further decentralized among local
governments therein—the size and role of the federal government has
expanded far beyond that original vision. In fact, the scope of federal law
has become so broad and all-encompassing that “a recent book claims that
the average American unknowingly commits three felonies a day due to
vague federal laws.”111
Although reasonable minds may differ as to the proper role of the
federal government, it should be generally recognized that due to its size,
the federal government is less responsive than state governments, which
are in turn less responsive than local governments.112 This principle is
even more true for territories. Not only is the federal government
generally less responsive to territorial concerns by virtue of the territories’
underrepresentation in Congress, but territorial governments are
significantly more accessible to the people of the territories than typical
state governments.
It is no secret there is a significant lack of funding parity for the
territories for many federal programs. 113 Although there is justifiable
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optimism that parity may soon be achieved through the federal courts 114 or
the political process, 115 it is not guaranteed. This optimism could easily
be derailed through an unfavorable judicial decision or a breakdown in the
federal legislative process.
The territories, however, are not completely powerless on these
matters. Even if federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) are not extended to the people of the territories, there is absolutely
nothing—other than funding—which precludes territorial governments
from establishing identical, or even more robust, benefits programs for
their citizens. Certainly, some of the territories—particularly Puerto
Rico—are fiscally challenged and in no position to substitute a local
program for a federal program. As a normative matter, they should not be
expected to do so, at least so long as the federal government continues to
fund such programs for the fifty states.
Yet, there are certain benefits—largely financial—to territorial
status. To give just one prominent example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the restraints of the Dormant
Commerce Clause do not apply to Guam and the Northern Mariana
Islands because they are not state governments. As such, the governments
of those territories may adopt laws that discriminate against non-local
commerce that would be unconstitutional if enacted by a state. 116 Some of
these discriminatory taxes and fees may be quite high. For example, the
Northern Mariana Islands charge a fee of five-thousand dollars for nonresident attorneys to obtain pro hac vice admission,117 a sum substantially
greater than similar admission costs in other United States jurisdictions.118
Of course, some territories—such as the U.S. Virgin Islands,
where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and held that the Dormant Commerce
Clause limits actions of the territorial government—lack the capacity to
do this.119
Moreover, even the territories authorized to enact
discriminatory taxes may have already directed such funds to other
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priorities; they may find it difficult to redirect those funds or enact new
taxes, even those borne predominantly by non-residents.
But territorial governments already possess other powers which,
perhaps indirectly, could force the hand of the federal government to
provide equality in social-safety-net spending and other areas. The
territories’ respective Congressional delegates, while lacking a floor vote,
play a vital and necessary role in advocating for the territories’ interests in
the House of Representatives.
One may wonder, then, why the territories have largely failed in
their attempts to obtain funding parity with the states. Certainly, many
factors contribute to the inability of legislation to pass in Congress.
However, unlike the states—the smallest of which will always have at
least three representatives in Congress—the territories are hamstrung by
only having a single delegate each. It is often forgotten in discussions of
the territories’ representation in Congress that these delegates do not
operate as mere liaisons for the territory. Functionally, each territory’s
Delegate to Congress possesses all the same powers and duties as an
ordinary Representative, apart from a binding floor vote. As such,
delegates are expected not just to advocate for the local interests of their
territory, but also to fully participate in all the work of the House.
While each of the five territories currently sends one delegate, this
has not always been the case. In 1796, the territory of Tennessee sent two
“shadow” Senators to Congress in addition to their delegate, for the
purpose of lobbying the United States Senate for the territory’s interests,
including statehood.120 Since then, the territories of Michigan, Iowa,
California, Oregon, Kansas, and Alaska made similar use of shadow
Senators.121 And since 1990, in addition to its Delegate to Congress, two
“shadow” Senators, as well as a shadow Representative, have been
continuously elected by the District of Columbia to advocate for its local
interests.122
The success of this model has spurred Puerto Rico to recently send
a shadow delegation to Congress, consisting of two shadow Senators and
five shadow Representatives.123 Significantly, two of Puerto Rico’s first
shadow Representatives were permitted to access the House floor due to
their former status as members of Congress, providing them with
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meaningful access to use their positions to lobby for the territory’s
interests.124 It remains to be seen whether Puerto Rico’s shadow
delegation will reap tangible benefits for the territory, but Puerto Rico’s
Resident Commissioner—its equivalent of a delegate of Congress—
welcomed the assistance. 125
Another impediment to the territories’—or at least American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands—ability to achieve parity involves the demographics and
backgrounds of high-level federal and territorial officials. To give just
one example: those four territories do not have a local law school, yet
their territorial supreme courts require that one earn a degree from a law
school accredited by the American Bar Association. This means that all
lawyers in those territories are effectively imported, regardless of whether
they have previously resided in the territory or have left the territory for a
three-year period to be indoctrinated into a legal culture that either ignores
the territories or actively supports their second-class status. This
necessarily results in a “pool” of qualified individuals that does not reflect
the demographics of the territory—clearly, this is a problem.
C. Cooperation with State Governments and Other Stakeholders
The federal government is not the only entity in a position to
improve conditions for territorial residents. While most attention is
focused on the inequities that federal law imposes on the territories—such
as lack of funding parity for many federal programs126—there are laws
and judicial precedents in place in the fifty states that actively
discriminate against the territories. To give just one example: although
the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAVA) mandates that citizens of a state who move to a foreign
country, American Samoa, or the Northern Mariana Islands retain their
right to vote in that state by absentee ballot, there is nothing in that statute
to prohibit states from extending the same rights to Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.127 Federal legislation, then, is clearly not the
only solution—the governments of each state could be lobbied as well.
In addition to amending or repealing discriminatory laws, state
governments can also make proactive efforts to improve conditions for the
territories. The states that have enacted the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact could amend the agreement to include votes from the
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territories when determining the popular vote; if the compact is ever
ratified by enough states to give it legal force, inclusion of the territories
in this manner would provide the people of the territories with a
meaningful vote for President of the United States without the need for a
constitutional amendment. State governments could enter into reciprocity
agreements with the territories to provide in-state tuition to territorial
residents of their state universities. And, of course, state legislations
could hold hearings on the Insular Cases and prohibit their attorneys
general from citing them as legal authority, increasing the likelihood that
they will eventually be overturned or, at the very least, that they will not
receive further expansion.
V. CONCLUSION
For the nearly four million Americans living in the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and
Guam, the words “equal justice under the law” may seem an unachievable
ideal. But that does not mean that the territories and their people should
just give up and accept second-class status. On the contrary, the failure of
the United States to live up to this ideal should serve as even greater
motivation to “go out every day and fight for the principles on which this
country was founded.”128
The people of the territories, like other oppressed or marginalized
groups before them, face many obstacles in their path for equality. But
these obstacles are certainly not insurmountable. The territories do not
need to concede the plenary authority of the federal government over their
own affairs. Nor do they need would-be saviors masquerading as allies
and urging them to trade self-determination and human rights for a more
benevolent colonial overseer. The path of progress may be difficult, but
the territories and their peoples possess the wherewithal to walk it and
achieve their goals without compromising their basic human rights and
dignity.
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